Maryland Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 3

Article 4

Book Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Recommended Citation
Book Review, 49 Md. L. Rev. 843 (1990)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/4

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Book Review
By Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.*
The Michie Company 1989.

MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK.

REVIEWED BYJOHN

M.

BRUMBAUGH**

INTRODUCTION

Judge Murphy has written an immensely helpful book' for
Maryland practitioners.2 It is, as advertised, a "handbook" of a little
over 700 pages (more than 100 of which are index) in a convenient 6
1/2 by 9 1/4 inch size. For the novice, it provides a concise introduction and explanation of Maryland evidence law. The experienced judge or advocate also can learn a few new things. For all, it
is a good source for a first analysis of an evidence problem, as well
as a security blanket for that terrible moment in court when one
cannot quite recall the rule or the authorities.'
In remarkably compact form, it provides not only a restatement
of the law, including the most recent relevant authorities in support
of each proposition, but also treatment of ethical problems and
sound practical advice for the advocate. Judge Murphy is not shy
about giving his opinion; he criticizes cases and makes suggestions
for changes. On the whole, his judgments seem to me to be good.4
© Copyright 1990 by John M. Brumbaugh.
* Judge, Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland; Lecturer, University of
Maryland School of Law and University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of
Maryland School of Law, 1969; A.B., Boston College, 1965.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1951; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1948.
1. J. MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (1989).
2. Although he is an experienced Maryland Circuit Court Judge, practitioner, and
law teacher, it is remarkable that the author has been able to produce so fine a volume,
given the initial handicap of having been in this reviewer's evidence class in law school.
3. For a somewhat more detailed treatment, the Maryland practitioner might consult another good work, L. McLAIN, Maryland Evidence, State and Federal in 5, 6 WEST'S
MARYLAND PRACTICE (1987).
4. Criticism of the following issues is especially well taken: Maryland's "schizophrenic" position on the admission of subsequent remedial measures to prove fault, see
J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 512; the treatment of declarations against interest in Agnew v.
State, 51 Md. App. 614, 446 A.2d 425 (1982), seeJ. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 802(E); and
limitation of cross-examination on matters going to "personal" bias, see id. § 1302
(E)(l)(b). On the other hand, I do not think that the criticism in § 518(E)(3) of Judge
Adkins's attempt to explain when other crimes evidence is admissible to prove such
things as identity and common scheme is warranted. Judge Murphy would like the
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The presentation is logical, and the writing is vivid and easy to read,
with many flashes of humor.
The section on Anticipating Impeachment is a good example of
Judge Murphy's clear writing, informal style, and ability to summarize and illustrate his point:
If you must call a witness who has been convicted of
burglary, and the other side is certain to cross-examine him
about this conviction, you are permitted to "defuse the
bomb" by bringing the conviction out during direct examination. "Voucher rule" objections are occasionally made
to this permissible technique of "defusing the bomb" or
"drawing the teeth." It is obvious, however, that the conviction is not being brought out to attack credibility but
rather to soften the blow that might otherwise be a knockout punch.
Prosecutors may establish during direct examination
that the state's witness is testifying as a result of a plea bargain. The criminal defendant may acknowledge any impeachable convictions, during his direct examination.
Whitehead holds that even though the conviction is introduced during the defendant's direct examination, he is entitled to a limiting instruction that the conviction can be
considered for no purpose other than to evaluate his
credibility.
It is one thing to defuse the bomb. You obviously
don't want it to blow up in your face, but you are prohibited from unfairly dropping it in your opponent's lap under
the guise of anticipating impeachment. Evidence that
would unfairly prejudice your opponent cannot be used to
"defuse the bomb" merely because it would be a proper
subject for redirect examination if opposing counsel
"opens the door" to it on cross.
Jerome Werner was charged with child abuse. The key
witness against him was his eldest stepdaughter, who had
failed to report the crime for several years. If defense
counsel cross-examined this witness about when she first
made the accusation, such permissible impeachment would
"open the door" for her to explain, during redirect examination, why she had not reported it sooner. The stepdaughter's explanation, however, did not come during
redirect examination. She explained on direct that she had
decided never to report the abuse done her, but changed
Court of Appeals to furnish a clearer guide for the lower courts, but I doubt that the
nature of the problem permits rules which are easily applied.
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her mind when she learned that the defendant did the same
thing to her younger sister. The Court of Appeals held
that the defendant was unfairly prejudiced because the trial
judge should not have permitted this explanation unless
and until Werner himself made an issue
out of the delay by
5
bringing it out on cross-examination.
Other examples of particularly good treatment are the sections
on Psychiatric Impeachment, 6 Subsequent Remedial Measures, 7 and
Videotape Depositions of Experts.8
There comes a point in a book review when the reviewer is
bound by the canons of his profession to turn upon the work he has
justly praised to attempt to demonstrate that he is smarter, more
learned, or a better hair-splitter than the author. Since my reservations go not to the plan or structure of the work, but to the author's
treatment of some isolated points of evidence law, there are no pervasive theoretical themes in what follows. I hope that the reader will
be willing to accept what amounts to a series of marginal notes, as I
explore what I believe to be omissions, errors, and doubtful judgments in the book.
I.

OMISSIONS

Sometimes a reader believes an omission to be accidental when,
in fact, it is the result of a thoughtful pruning by the author. I, however, would have liked to see a few things I did not find.
A.

Impeachment by Contradictionor Specific Error

An important ground for impeachment not identified in the text
sections addressing modes of impeachment' is contradiction or specific error.'0 This is something apart from self-contradiction, as in
prior inconsistent statements. The idea is that a witness who can be
shown to be wrong about some things may be wrong about other
things, as well. The two grounds may appear together: when a second witness testifies that the first witness claimed that there was no
stop sign at an intersection after the first witness testifies that there
5. J.

MURPHY,

supra note 1,

§ 1208 (citations omitted).

6. Id. § 1302(D).

7. Id. § 512.
8. Id. § 803(A).

9. Id. §§ 1302(A)-1302(F)(2).
10. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Judge Murphy mentions it in passing. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1304(A), at 472 (Extrinsic Impeachment:
The Rule of Collateralness).

846

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:843

was a stop sign, the impeachment may suggest both self-contradiction and specific error by the first witness in testifying that there was
a stop sign. When the specific error is on a point at issue on the
merits, it is easy to overlook the possible general impeaching effect
of witness disagreement because of the obvious use on the merits.
When it is not relevant on the merits, on some other impeaching
ground allowing extrinsic evidence, or as "keystone" or "linchpin"
evidence," a second witness may not be called to impeach the first,
on the principle of Attorney-General v. Hitchcock. 2
B.

Ancient Documents; Authentication Generally

In his treatment of the hearsay exception for ancient deeds,"3
Judge Murphy does not mention that the exception may extend to
other ancient documents,' 4 and there is no mention in the material
on authentication of documents of the ancient documents authentication rule. Indeed, he gives the topic of authentication of documents rather short shrift. 5 For example, there is nothing on selfauthentication of acknowledged instruments.16
C.

Continuing Unsafe Condition

In dealing with evidence of prior similar occurrences to show
notice of a danger,' 7 Judge Murphy properly relies on the authority
11. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 47, at 112 n.19. One example of
this "linchpin" evidence given by McCormick is East Tennessee, V. and G. Ry. Co. v.
Daniel, 91 Ga. 768, 18 S.E. 22 (1893), in which the witness explained his disputed presence at the scene of an accident by saying that he was on the way home from a store
where he had bought tobacco. Testimony by the storekeeper that the first witness had
not purchased tobacco that day was held admissible. Id. at 769, 18 S.E. at 22. The

whole force of the testimony disappears when the linchpin is removed, even though
evidence about it is otherwise irrelevant.
12. 1 Ex. 91, 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (1847) (upon cross-examination, a Crown witness
denied that he had stated that the Crown had offered him a bribe for his testimony; held
that the defendant could not call another witness to prove that the statement had been
made). Disagreement about a statement of receipt of a bribe might have been admissible
on bias; the court did not consider the offered evidence as conduct admitting the
Crown's weak case. Maryland has a number of cases involving such impeachment. See,
e.g., White v. State, 3 Md. App. 167, 172, 238 A.2d 278, 281 (1968) (child witness, an
alleged victim of a sex offense, testified on cross-examination that he had never killed a
dog; held proper to exclude extrinsic evidence that he had done so).
13. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 802(H)(2).
14. L. McLAIN (6 WEST'S MARYLAND PRACTICE), supra note 3, § 901.9, (stating the
common law rule as to ancient document authentication to be Maryland law).
15. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1104(A).
16. But see MD. ANN. CODE art. 18, § 9 (1987) (authentication of acknowledgements).
17. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 519(B).
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of Locke, Inc. v. Sonnenleiter. 8 Locke might also be cited for a different
ground on which prior or subsequent occurrences may be admissible: to show the continuing danger posed by unsafely designed or
constructed items." While this proposition is made evident in
Judge Murphy's lengthy quotation from Locke, 20 its relevance is not
discussed in the text.
D.

Characterof the Victim in Rape/Consent and Self-Defense Cases

In addressing the rape shield statute,2 ' the author might have
gone further in contrasting the statutory rule that character evidence is inadmissible on the issue of consent in a rape case, with the
contrary rule, consistent with the pre-statutory rule in consent cases,
that character evidence of the victim's violence is admissible on the
issue of self-defense in a homicide case.2" Rationales for the contrasting rules go beyond the difficulty of prosecuting rape/consent
cases when consent is at issue without a shield of some sort to encourage the victim to testify. Reputation or opinion as to violence is
more likely to reflect character correctly than evidence as to chastity,
which is a less discoverable character trait. The inference from
character to conduct also may be stronger in the violence cases than
in the consent cases. Tendency to violence may be a more consistent trait than tendency to consent. These are good reasons for the
difference.
E. Admissions by Servants
In a way, I am glad that the author, in his discussion2 3 of the
unfortunate Maryland rule of Feigley v. Baltimore Transit Co.,24 that
vicarious admissions are limited to those authorized to be made,
and do not otherwise include statements made about the job while
still employed, did not mention the especially regrettable case of
Burkrowske v. Church Hospital Corp.,25 which added a spurious requirement for vicarious admissions that the utterance be made contem18. 208 Md. 443, 118 A.2d 509 (1955).
19. See id. at 451, 118 A.2d at 513.

20. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 519(B), at 200-01. It also is mentioned in another
quotation from Wise v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 25 A. 424 (1892). SeeJ. MURPHY, supra
note 1, § 519, at 196-98.
21. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 506(B); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1987).
22. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 516(B).
23. Id. § 805(D).
24. 211 Md. 1, 124 A.2d 822 (1956).
25. 50 Md. App. 515, 439 A.2d 40 (1982).

848

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:843

poraneously with the transaction to which it relates. 2 6
F. Attorney-Client Privilege: Joint Clients
The discussion of confidentiality in joint client situations requires qualification. 2 7 The author argues that if criminal co-defendants consult a lawyer together, the discussions should remain
privileged even if one of the two clients later turns State's evidence.
The implied understanding at the time of consultation is that the
State is the common enemy and that disclosure is not to be made in
contests between the State and one of the defendants. By contrast,
ifjoint clients have a falling out and one of them later sues another,
the usual conclusion is that the privilege does not attach to communications made by one in the presence of the other; no contest between the two clients was contemplated and no need for secrecy was
anticipated.2 8
II.

ERRORS

I hesitate to use this heading. I found very few things that I
thought plainly wrong, and it is possible that I merely expose my
own ignorance in claiming the author to be wrong. Nevertheless,
there are a few things that bothered me.
A.

Specific Acts to Show Character on the Merits

In the discussion of the use of character evidence on the mer-

its, 29 I found what is perhaps my most serious disagreement with the

text. The author fails to draw a distinction between using evidence
of character to prove conduct and other uses of character evidence.
After discussion of the statute allowing opinion evidence as to character,3" the author says that the statute has gone further and given
"the trial judge ...discretion to admit specific instances evidence if
it is really probative of character."3 1 No authority is given for this
position where character is offered to prove conduct and I doubt
that there is any. 2 The old, and I think still existing rule that such
26. Id. at 520-21, 439 A.2d at 44; see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267 E. Cleary (2d

ed. 1972).
27. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 905(F).
28. See generally Trupp v. Wolff, 24 Md. App. 588, 611, 335 A.2d 171, 185 (1975);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 91.
29. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 516.
30. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-115 (1989).
31. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 516, at 175.
32. Of course, specific instance evidence has always been received when character is
in issue (and there is no further inference sought as to conduct on a particular occasion),
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evidence is inadmissible is expressed in Berger v. State."
The rule of exclusion seems sound when weighing the marginal
help character evidence contributes towards establishing conduct
on a particular occasion against the considerable dangers of consumption of time, surprise, confusion of issues, and prejudice.3 4
Specific acts may be admissible when reputation or opinion witnesses testify on character to show conduct, but in theory these go
only to the credibility of the character witness and not to the character of the person about whom the witness is testifying." The danger that the jury improperly may consider the evidence for the
wrong purpose does not affect the standing of the general rule.
B.

Reputation Witnesses

With respect to reputation witnesses, I am not sure that Maryland law is so well attuned to reputation in areas outside the witness'
residential community as the author seems to suggest." The old
law limited consideration to residential reputation.3 7 In Caldwell v.
State," the Court of Appeals cautiously extended consideration in
one kind of case (which, under the Rape Shield law, no longer
arises) to nonresidential communities." Although it is to be hoped
as when evidence of an act of theft is admitted on the issue of truth in a defamation case
in which defendant called plaintiff a thief. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10,
§§ 186, 187.
33. 179 Md. 410, 412, 20 A.2d 146, 147 (1941) (testimony by his wife concerning Dr.
Berger's sexual abnormalities during their marriage held inadmissible to show character
and conduct).
34. Of course, the same argument applies to excluding specific instances of misconduct to impeach a witness, except that there investigation would at least be limited to
cross-examination of the primary witness. Nobody ever said that the logic of the law of
evidence was perfect.
35. There are cases in which specific incidents are admissible to test the basis for an
opinion of a character witness, as in Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d
879 (1988), or the credibility of a character witness, as in Taylor v. State, 28 Md. App.
560, 346 A.2d 718 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 150, 360 A.2d 430 (1976), or to show a continuing course of conduct on a particular occasion, as in Brown v. State, 29 Md. App. 1, 349
A.2d 359 (1975).
36. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1302(A). The author states:
Your impeaching witness must either (1) be aware of the reputation of the
other witness for truthfulness and veracity (in the community where he lives, at
the place where he works, or in any other settings where persons would know
of his reputation); or (2) have a sufficient basis to form an opinion of the witness' character for this character trait.
Id. at 440.
37. See Allison v. State, 203 Md. 1, 98 A.2d 273 (1953); L. McLAIN (5 WEST'S MARYLAND PRACTICE), supra note 3, § 405.2.
38. 276 Md. 612, 349 A.2d 623 (1976).
39. Id. at 613, 349 A.2d at 627 (in a rape case, character for chastity may be shown by
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that the new rule will be extended to other situations, to my knowledge Maryland law does not support the broad sweep ofJudge Murphy's proposition.
III.

DOUBTFUL JUDGMENTS

These are some questions of judgment or interpretation on
which I might argue with Judge Murphy. I would not call him
wrong.
A.

Hearsay Issues

1. Implied assertions as hearsay.-In section 702(B), Judge Murphy deals with the always troublesome problem of implied assertions as hearsay. In the famous case of Wright v. Doe d. Tatham,4 °
letters from acquaintances to a testator, tending to show the opinions of the writers that he was competent to conduct his affairs, were
excluded as hearsay, apparently because, while they did not directly
assert competence, they were offered to show competence. The letters also might have been excluded as doubtfully relevant opinion
because they were written many years before the date of the will and
did not clearly establish that the writers were of the opinion that the
testator was competent. The case, followed in Maryland on similar
facts, 4 is unsound on the hearsay point, according to modern theory, because there is no indication that the writers were thinking
42
about or intending to assert anything about the testator's capacity.
Their sincerity regarding capacity therefore is not in question, and
the hearsay danger, though not eliminated, is sufficiently reduced to
allow the letters to be admitted as circumstantial evidence of the
testator's mental state, assuming sufficient relevance is established.
One hopes, as Judge Murphy predicts, that when the question is
presented, the Court of Appeals will overrule its decision following
Wright on the hearsay point.
I am much less sure about the author's application" of this
newer hearsay doctrine to cases like Courtney v. State.4 4 In Courtney,
police officers answered the accused's telephone on a number of occasions and heard unidentifiable voices purporting to place bets.
proof of general reputation in any substantial community of people among whom victim
is well known).

40. 5 Cl. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559; 4 Bing. (N.C.) 489, 132 Eng. Rep. 877 (1838).
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 531, 544-46 (1872).
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 250, at 737-39.
SeeJ. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 702(B).
187 Md. 1, 48 A.2d 430 (1946).

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

851

The substance of these calls was offered as evidence that the phone
was used for betting purposes. It seems to me that the statements
made by the callers are not implied assertions, but direct assertions,
offered for their truth. If the calls are worth anything on the point
for which they are received, it is because we believe the statements
of the callers that they wish to place bets. These direct assertions
about the declarants' states of mind should be treated as hearsay,
notwithstanding authority to the contrary.4 5 Perhaps they come
within an exception for trustworthy declarations as to state of mind,
or some other exception. Certainly, the number of calls to some
extent diminishes our concerns about the sincerity of individual callers. But they are not, I think, "implied assertions."
2. Present sense impressions as a hearsay exception.-In his discussion of the dubious hearsay exception for present sense impressions, the author suggests that the exception be limited to cases in
which the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 4 6 I agree. There is
no real need for the exception in most cases in which the speaker
testifies. Furthermore, I find it difficult to accept such evidence in
any case in which the declarant is not speaking to someone with an
equal opportunity to observe the event, a situation in which the
speaker is not likely to lie about what is perceived. Without some
such assurance, there is no special reason to assume reliability.
Such statements, of course, may be as reliable as excited utterances,
and these are freely admitted. Perhaps it would be more satisfying
to have a broad exception, at least in civil cases, for statements
based on first hand knowledge, when the unavailable declarant has
no known significant motive to falsify, 4 7 than to adopt rules admitting parts of such evidence, with nothing in particular to recommend them.
3. Past recollection recorded.-Judge Murphy has an interesting
proposal for reform in connection with the hearsay exception for
45. The telephone gambling cases are collected in Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence
of Fact of Making or Receiving Telephone Calls, 13 A.L.R.2d 1409, 1414 (1950). Failure to
classify such bets as hearsay is questioned in Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 198 (1948).
46. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 803(B). Judge Murphy also suggests that when the
witness is available, the testimony should be treated as prior consistent testimony. Id. at
266.
47. Cf MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1986) which provides in part: "In
any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not
be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay . . . if the court finds that it was made in good
faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."
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past recollection recorded. He believes that a part of the necessary
foundation for its admission should be a showing of the absence of
an apparent motive to falsify. 48 He contrasts this requirement with
the rule that prior consistent statements are not admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness, unless the statements were made
" 'prior to the time of probable fabrication.'
There are differences between the two situations.
The prior consistent statement, absent a more recent motive to
falsify, does nothing to rehabilitate a witness who has made a prior
inconsistent statement. The inconsistency remains unexplained;
counting the number of times the witness has taken each position is
no help. When the cross-examiner, however, suggests that a prior
inconsistent statement was the truth and that the witness has a motive to testify differently, it does blunt the attack to show that the
witness made a statement in accordance with his testimony before
there was any motive to falsify. The making of the statement prior
to the existence of the motive to falsify is essential to give the statement any weight at all.
For past recollection recorded, the witness normally testifies
that he once perceived the event in question, that he no longer remembers it (or no longer remembers it clearly), and that he made or
read a contemporaneous accurate record of the event. 5 ° That record is then received in evidence for its truth. The witness is subject
to cross-examination, which his claimed memory loss may allow him
to evade. But the memory loss would not usually block investigation
of bias or motive to falsify, which, if shown, would weaken the force
of the testimony. I see no need to exclude the record of past recollection because a motive to falsify can be shown; it is quite possible
that the bias exists, but the record is correct. Why bar the proponent's use of the evidence altogether?
"4'

4. Business records: accident reports by employees.-I find confusing
the discussion5 1 of Palmer v. Hoffman, 5 2 which attempts to follow the
48. J. MURPHY, supra note 1,§ 801(B)(1).
49. Id. at 250 (quoting Boone v. State, 33 Md. App. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 550, 553-54
(1976)).
50. See Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 701, 452 A.2d 661, 666 (1982) (prior written
statement not past recollection recorded where witness had no impairment of present
recollection); Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 172-77 (1960) (record admissible where witness testified it was accurately and contemporaneously made, but not fully
remembered). For the distinction between past recollection recorded and present recollection revived, see Baker v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 371 A.2d 699 (1977).
51. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 804(a).
52. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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reasoning of Justice Douglas for the Supreme Court. Judge Frank's
opinion below5" is much better than the Supreme Court opinion affirming it. In his decision, Judge Frank found self-serving reports of
the railroad engineer after the accident were properly excluded as
business records because the report was hardly routine from the
point of view of the engineer, and the routine nature of the report is
important to assure reliability of the record.5 4 Despite Justice
Douglas' view,5 5 keeping records as to accidents certainly could be a
part of the ordinary business of a railroad. There is no proper reason to exclude the reports as business records when those involved
in routine reports have no significant motive to falsify.
5. Due process, the catchall hearsay exception, and some old exceptions.-Among recent Maryland cases, one of the most interesting
theoretically is Fosterv. State,5 6 which Judge Murphy properly cites as
coming close to recognizing a catchall exception to the hearsay
rule.5 7 In a split decision, the case was decided on the constitutional
ground that, even if the excluded testimony was hearsay, it was so
persuasive and important that exclusion was a denial of due process.5 8 Judge Eldridge, on a motion for reconsideration, thought
that the court also should have exercised its common-law power to
create a new hearsay exception for the evidence.5 9 Judge Murphy
thinks that death penalty cases make bad evidence law. 60 I think that
there is a good argument for admitting the evidence on the basis of
standard hearsay exceptions. 6 '
53. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
54. Id. at 991.
55. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 114 ("Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable,
bills of lading and the like, these reports are calculated for use essentially in the court,
not in the business. Their primary purpose is in litigating, not in railroading.").
56. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
57. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 809, at 305.
58. Foster, 297 Md. at 211-12, 464 A.2d at 997.
59. Id. at 230, 464 A.2d at 1006 (Eldridge, J., concurring in denial of motion for
reconsideration).
60. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 809.
61. If I had a free hand in recreating the law of evidence, I would not exclude evidence offered on behalf of a criminal defendant, except on such grounds as privilege,
extreme prejudice or harm to others, or waste of time. The remote likelihood that the
jury will be misled by dubious hearsay or attempts to justify actions seems outweighed
by our wish to make sure the jury has heard all that reasonably can be said on behalf of
the accused. Compare the English practice, described in G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF
GUILT 209-10 (3d ed. 1963):
The books on evidence do not distinguish between the rules of hearsay as
applied to the evidence for the Crown and as applied to the evidence for the
defence. . . . Most people would say, however, that there should be a great
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In Foster, the witness and the victim were friends, who both
managed motels and apparently frequently talked together on the
telephone. The witness was prepared to testify that about two-anda-half weeks before her death, the victim telephoned her "in an almost hysterical state" to tell her that the defendant's husband (who,
the defense suggested, might be the killer, rather than the defendant) had threatened to kill her. 2 To get this statement admitted for
its truth, we must deal with two levels of hearsay: the declaration of
the defendant's husband and the declaration of the victim. The first
is a fairly strong candidate for the state of mind exception if the
victim's statement can be admitted. The victim's statement also
might reasonably have fallen within the exception for excited utterances. The witness could testify to the actual excitement. However,
as the State pointed out in its brief on appeal,63 there was nothing to
show whether the alleged threat to the victim occurred a minute, an
hour, or a day after the alleged threat was made.
I wonder if there is not a fair inference from the victim's near
hysteria that the threat had occurred very recently-recently enough
to qualify the statement as an excited utterance. Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) provides that when making a determination as to
admissibility, the trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence
(except as to privilege). Such a rule is almost unavoidable in many
admissibility situations, and the Court of Special Appeals has taken
the position that the trial judge may consider hearsay in determining questions of admissibility.' I believe that the trial judge could
have properly concluded from the circumstances of the call as described by 5the witness that the victim's statement was an excited
6
utterance.
difference between the position of the defence and that of the prosecution. A
miscarriage ofjustice should not be risked by shutting out any evidence for the
defence, even though it may be hearsay. Accordingly, Crown counsel frequently take no objection to defence evidence even when they might technically
be able to do so. As Sir Herbert Stephen wrote [in THE CONDUCT OF AN ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 11 (London 1926)]:
The counsel for the prosecution ... seldom if ever raises any objection to
questions proposed to be asked in the course of the defence upon any ground
except that they are a waste of time, or likely to distract the attention of the jury
from the substantial issues of the case.

62. 297 Md. 191, 200-01, 464 A.2d 986, 991 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984).
63. Brief for Appellee at 21, Foster (No. 81-175).
64. Collins v. State, 39 Md. App. 165, 168, 384 A.2d 120, 122 (1978).
65. I concede that this is not necessarily to say that the trial judge was required to so
conclude. I am more interested, however, in exploring the hearsay problem than the
problem of the discretion of the trial judge. Judge Murphy might protest that the victim

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

855

If my standard exception argument fails, I agree with Judge Eldridge in his opinion in the motion for reconsideration that this is a
good candidate for a special exception.6 6 If the witness is telling the
truth, a matter to be tested by cross-examination, the evidence
seems important and probably sufficiently reliable to compel its
admission.
B.

Other Problems

1. Prior bad acts (without convictions) on credibility.-Judge Murphy confidently concludes that Maryland admits prior bad actswhen there has been no conviction-to impeach a witness.6 7 This
conclusion is fair enough given the most recent pronouncements of
the Court of Appeals.6" There is, however, another line of authority
which fairly read puts Maryland in the camp which excludes this as a
ground of impeachment. 6 9 Good arguments exist on both sides as
to what the law should be. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals has not really dealt with the problem beyond merely choosing
to follow one precedent when the precedents are mixed. The policy
goes unexamined.
2. The turncoat witness.-While I do not agree with the author's
opinion that the voucher rule barring impeachment of one's own
witness in the ordinary case should have been retained,7" I think he
is right to note that abolition can produce bad results in the case of
the turncoat witness. The old rule allowed counsel who was
harmfully surprised by a turncoat witness to impeach that witness by
made a number of statements during this agitated conversation, and that it stretches the
excited utterance exception too far to extend it to a fairly long conversation.
66. Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191,230-34,464 A.2d 986, 1006-08 (1983) (Eldridge,J.,
concurring in denial of motion for reconsideration), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
67. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1302(C), at 447.
68. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 201, 468 A.2d 328, 333 (1983) (prior
bad acts admissible, but only those which are very closely related to witness' veracity and
for which counsel can demonstrate a firm basis for believing the conduct in fact occurred); State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 183-84, 468 A.2d 319, 323-24 (1983) (evidence that
prosecutrix in rape case previously charged another with criminal assault and then recanted under oath such charge admitted).
69. See, e.g., Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 340, 439 A.2d 534, 54041 (1982) (except for criminal convictions, specific acts of misconduct are inadmissible
to impeach credibility of witness). This case is not convincingly distinguished in the
cases Judge Murphy cites.
70. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1201. The Court of Appeals abolished the voucher
rule as of January 1, 1989, in Maryland Rule 1-501, derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 607. Compare MD. R. 1-501 with FED. R. EVID. 607.
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showing a prior inconsistent statement, to limit the damage. 7 This
is necessary first aid, but it does have the unfortunate side-effect of
allowing the jury to hear the inadmissible hearsay evidence.7 2 If I
may freely impeach my own witness, it seems that, unless the nonvoucher rule is qualified, I may freely call a turncoat witness, ostensibly for the purpose of getting legitimate help from the testimony,
but actually for the improper hearsay effect of the prior inconsistent
statement. I hope that decisions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially rule 403, may read some of the old limitations back
into the nonvoucher rule.73
3. The best evidence rule: originals.-In his discussion of when an
original writing is required,7 4 the author notes that to prove what
was said by a witness at a trial there is no requirement that the trial
transcript be produced; anyone present may testify from memory as
to what was said. This is because the "original" is oral testimony
rather than a writing. The transcript is only one method of showing
what the spoken words were. I would enter a mild dissent to Judge
Murphy's claim that "every reasonable person would agree that the
court reporter's transcript would be the most clear, direct, explicit,
reliable, and satisfactory proof" of the testimony. 75 While a transcript has a far higher probability of accuracy than most alternatives,
we have all seen transcripts with fairly obvious errors of transcription, particularly when the reporter has misunderstood technical ev71. See, e.g., Green v. State, 243 Md. 154, 157, 220 A.2d 544, 546 (1966) (rule that
party who calls witness on reliance upon prior statement is allowed to use that statement
to impeach has been followed in Maryland).
72. Of course, it is arguable that prior inconsistent statements should not be treated
as hearsay because the witness is present, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.
Unless this rule is changed, however, we must be concerned about unauthorized borrowing by the jury of the theoretical impeachment evidence for use in their decision on
the merits.
73. United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977), suggests
that it is necessary for the prosecution to show harm, though not surprise. Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 reads as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Thus, even if evidence is technically relevant and allowable, the trial judge may still exclude it. See United States v. Mangiameli,
668 F.2d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir.) (court found no abuse of discretion in trial court's determination that probative value of evidence was "outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues, introducing collateral issues, collateral to this trial, and leading to, of
course, undue delay in the trial"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); Rhodes v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 542 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (even when evidence technically relevant, it may be excluded under rule 403).
74. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1104(B)(1).
75. Id. at 401.
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idence. Those present and familiar with the subject matter of the
testimony might find it easy to agree that the transcript is unreliable.
This is one reason for not closing off alternative methods of proof.
Nobody argues that the transcript is not admissible or that advocates cannot complain of its absence, but it is not the final answer.7 6
The author might have noted that if one elects to prove an
event through a written record of it, the rule requires production of
the record, if possible. 7 7 A copy of it, or the testimony of one who
has read the record and testifies on the basis of what he has read, is
78
insufficient.
IV.

FINAL PROBLEMS

I would like here to look at a few troublesome Maryland evidence cases, all cited by the author. I have no criticism of the way in
which he addresses them, and I merely take this opportunity to express a few reservations about the way that evidence law develops.

76. I have always thought that Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439, 30 A.2d 744 (1943), cited
in J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1104(B)(1), rightly decided that the State should be required on demand to introduce the written form of an originally oral confession, as well
as the testimony of the police who heard it. I feel that this case, however, has been
wrongly classified as one falling under the best evidence rule. The written form is not
"the original confession." There is no parol evidence rule for confessions, making the
written form the last word. Nevertheless, given police procurement and control of the
document and our wish to hear all versions of what the accused may have said, the conclusion of the case makes very good sense for reasons similar to those supporting the
best evidence rule.
77. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Eng'rs v. Nash, 144 Md. 623, 643,
125 A. 441, 449 (1924) (in case in which proof of decedent's death was attempted
through morgue findings, records of the city morgue findings were the best evidence of
its contents); Davis v. State, 7 Md. App. 667, 670, 256 A.2d 819, 820-21 (1969) (when
proof of automobile ownership attempted through motor vehicle records, testimony of
police officer as to those records violated best evidence rule); 6 L. McLAIN, supra note 3,
§ 1001.4.
78. Two further points may be worth brief mention: (1) Hypnotically induced testimony.
I question what seems to be Judge Murphy's interpretation of Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44 (1987), that a criminal defendant is always constitutionally entitled to introduce
hypnotically induced testimony. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 602(B)(2)(a). The Rock case
merely held that a per se rule excluding such testimony is invalid. 483 U.S. at 61. (2)
Expert testimony: basis. I do not read State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520,
209 A.2d 555, 559 (1965), as denying the usual rule that in the discretion of the court,
an expert witness need not state his basis before giving his opinion. I see no implication
from the phrase "premises of fact," that such premises must be stated before the opinion is given. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1405. Such a limitation conflicts in spirit with
current liberalizing trends broadening the permissible basis for the expert's opinion. See
id. § 1405(B).
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Business Records: Authentication and Corroboration

When Judge Murphy cannot quite understand how a court
reached its conclusion, he may simply state that the opinion writer
"explained"-and then repeats the (inadequate) explanation. For
example in Morrow v. State,7 9 in which the trial judge had excluded a
purported sales slip from an out-of-state service station, the slip was
offered to corroborate the witness's testimony that the accused and
his friend, the witness, had been at the service station on the date
the crime was committed in Maryland. The Court of Appeals noted
that the slip was inadmissible hearsay if offered to prove that the
defendant had made the payment indicated on the slip, but seems to
have thought it was not hearsay to show that the slip was made out
and delivered by the proprietor of the service station.8 0 This explanation is somewhat strange. If the slip is offered for its truth, it is
hearsay. If it is not, it does not really corroborate the witness's account any more than would the production of a dandelion the witness claimed to have picked up at roadside on that day.
(Admittedly, it is a bit harder to print a false form and fill it out than
to find a convincing dandelion.) 8 ' If the sales slip had evidentiary
value in Morrow, it was only because of the hearsay declarations in
the slip about who made it out and to whom and when it was given.
A descendant of Morrow, Thomas v. Owens, 2 "explains" why an
unauthenticated hospital bill was admissible to prove services rendered. In addition to the corroboration theory, for which Judge Eldridge (specially assigned) found ancient and long-forgotten
79. 190 Md. 559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948), discussed in J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 503, at
147.
80. Id. at 562, 59 A.2d at 326. The court brushed aside the lack of foundation for the
slip as a business record and seemed to suggest the business records hearsay exception
as an alternate ground for admission. This attitude is echoed in Thomas v. Owens, 28
Md. App. 442, 346 A.2d 662 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 82-84, 85. The
trial judge is not bound by the formal rules of evidence on questions of admissibility. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text. However, ordinary business records are not selfauthenticating. 7J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2130, at 709-10 (rev. 1978). The testimony
of an outsider to the business would seem inadequate as foundation. Thomas does not
even have the excuse of a more difficult to prove out-of-state record for evading the
normal requirement.
81. Barrister W.S. Gilbert, speaking through Pooh-Bah, explained such embellishments: "Merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative." W. Gilbert, The Mikado, Act H (1885). I do not
mean to suggest disbelief in the witness's testimony in Morrow; it is only that the purported sales slip is not much help in deciding the issue.
82. 28 Md. App. 442, 346 A.2d 662 (1975), discussed in J. MURPHY, supra note 1,
§ 503, at 146-47.
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precedent, 3 "the invoice in question was issued by a government
agency pursuant to a statute authorizing recovery from Thomas of
the reasonable value of medical services rendered Owens." 4 How
do we know it was issued by the agency in accordance with routine
agency practice unless it is conceded or is shown to be authentic? It
is difficult to accept such documents-even if we are willing to concede their authenticity (authorship)-without some showing of the
business practice underlying their issuance. 5
B.

Former Testimony

Huffington v. State 6 is this reviewer's candidate for the most confusing opinion in Maryland evidence law in the last ten years. The
case is to be welcomed for its acceptance of the modern form of the
former testimony rule, but the attempt to apply the rule, by both the
majority and the dissent, leaves much to be desired.
The State first prosecuted Kanaras and later Huffington (who
may have been a conspirator of Kanaras's) for murder. At the first
trial, the State's witness, Rassa, testified in effect that shortly before
the killings Kanaras was involved with drugs (the victims were allegedly dealers), had visited the victims to buy cocaine, had been
armed, and had said that he would not mind killing the victims.
Rassa was unavailable at the second trial and the trial judge rejected
Huffington's attempt to admit Rassa's former testimony for the inference that Kanaras, not Huffington, was the killer.
The old law would have excluded the testimony for lack of identity of parties.8 7 The more modem Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1) accepts the testimony "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . . .had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
The Advisory Committee Note to the Rule explains:
Under the exception, the testimony may be offered (1)
against the party against whom it was previously offered or
83. Id. at 449, 346 A.2d at 666. See generally 5J. WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE §

1364, at 19-20

(rev. 1974).

84. Thomas, 28 Md. App. at 451, 346 A.2d at 667.
85. Maryland Rules 2-510(g) and 3-510(g), enacted since Thomas, admit in civil cases
certified copies of hospital records relating to the condition or treatment of a patient in a
civil case, when delivered to the court in response to subpoena. These safeguards seem
sufficient to make such records self-authenticating, but do not fully solve the problem of
proof of regularity of entry.
86. 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1023 (1986), discussed in
J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 802(D).
87. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 256.
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(2) against the party by whom it was previously offered. In
each instance the question resolves itself into whether fairness allows imposing, upon the party against whom now
offered, the handling of the witness on the earlier occasion ....
(2) If the party against whom now offered is the
one by whom the testimony was offered previously ....
[an]

acceptable approach is simply to recognize direct and redirect examination of one's own witness as the equivalent of
cross-examining an opponent's witness. . .

Allowable

techniques for dealing with hostile, doublecrossing, forgetful, and mentally deficient witnesses leave no substance to
a claim that one could not adequately develop his own witness at the former hearing. An even less appealing argument is presented when failure to develop fully was the
result of a deliberate choice.
The common law... did require identity of issues as a
means of insuring that the former handling of the witness
was the equivalent of what would now be done if the opportunity were presented. Modern decisions reduce the requirement to "substantial" identity ....

Since identity of

issues is significant only in that it bears on motive and interest in developing fully the testimony of the witness, expressing the matter in the latter terms is preferable. 8
Had the court simply followed the federal rule, it would have
found substantial identity of issues, sufficient to conclude that the
State, against whom the evidence was offered in the second trial,
had adequate motive and opportunity to develop the testimony
from the witness at Kanaras's trial. It seems clear that the State believed in the testimony at Kanaras's trial and wanted it put before
the jury to show Kanaras's connection with the killing. That was
enough to meet the federal rule requirement.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Huffington followed this
road. The majority upheld the exclusion of the former testimony
because it thought that the State had used it only for a limited purpose. It saw the focus at the first trial as a narrow one: had Kanaras,
contrary to his testimony, been recently involved with drugs?" As I
read the rule and commentary, however, the proper question is not
whether the motivation for use is identical; rather, it is whether the
88. FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note.
89. Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 573, 500 A.2d 272, 279 (1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1023 (1986). The dissent more convincingly noted that the State's use of evidence
at the first trial was much broader and went to Kanaras's guilt generally. Id. at 602-03,
500 A.2d at 294.
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motivation at the first trial to develop these issues fully makes it unfair to the state to have its own earlier-offered evidence received
against it without a present opportunity to cross-examine. Here,
there would be no such unfairness.
The dissent mistakenly thought that it was the motivation of
Huffington, who offered the testimony, rather than the motivation of
the State, against whom it was offered, at the second trial which was
significant. ° I do not agree with Judge Murphy that the dissent correctly applied the federal rule to the specific facts, 9 though it did
reach the correct conclusion.
C.

The Best Evidence Rule: Unsigned Carbon Copies

Let me close with an illustration of the way the law really develops. The late Chief Judge Frederick W. Brune retired from the
Court of Appeals many years ago and took up the task of chairing a
commission to revise the criminal law of Maryland-a task still unaccomplished. I was privileged to work with Judge Brune as the reporter for the commission. It always was a pleasure, as well as an
education, to work under his direction. He was the most painstaking and conscientious of writers; draft succeeded draft as he polished sections of the proposed code to make as sure as humanly
possible that there could be no misunderstanding of what was
meant. When he had finally gotten it "right" he would defend the
92
language to the death.
Chief Judge Brune was of a markedly conservative bent, particularly in his view of the proper role of the judge. He frequently told
me that he had not regarded it as his proper judicial function to
change the law in any but the most gradual and precedent-respect90. Id. at 597-98, 500 A.2d at 291-92 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
91. J. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 802(D), at 259.
92. I well recall one occasion in a committee meeting, when a timorous voice was
raised to suggest a possible undesired interpretation of the meaning of an insanity plea.
The chairman's magisterial response was that he had served on the Court of Appeals for
many years, with judges of various capacities, but that he had never run across one who
would be so blind and impervious to the obvious intention expressed in the draft as to
adopt the feared interpretation. That put an end to the discussion. Unfortunately,
many years later-mercifully after Judge Brune's death-the spumed view was unanimously adopted by the Court of Appeals in Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 597, 399
A.2d 578, 581-82 (1979) (the successful interposition of a plea of insanity is not that an
accused is to be found not guilty of the criminal act it was proved he committed, but that
he shall not be punished therefor.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981). It spoils the story
only a little to note that statutory language related to the provision in question had in
the interim been mutilated by amendments, making the judicial interpretation somewhat
more plausible.
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ing way. When I once remarked that he had certainly made a radical
change in evidence law, putting Maryland in the vanguard of reform, he indignantly denied the charge. I cited ParrConstruction Co.
v. Pomer9 3 for the proposition that unsigned carbon copies of letters
are duplicate originals for purposes of the best evidence rule-a
very advanced view for its time. He denied that he had written such
an opinion. We adjourned to the library. The case involved a contract dispute about how much dirt had been excavated by the plaintiff from the defendant company's building site. The parties agreed
to refer the dispute to an arbitrator, who apparently gave his decision in a letter to the defendant, with an unsigned carbon copy to
the plaintiff. The president of the defendant company (Scherr) was
called as a witness by plaintiff (Pomer); the witness conceded the
genuineness of plaintiff's copy, and it was admitted.
A best evidence objection was raised by defendant on appeal.
Chief Judge Brune wrote for the court:
The objection based on the best evidence rule is without merit. Scherr was called as a witness by Pomer and
identified the unsigned carbon as a copy of the original letter received by him ....
A carbon copy of a letter is considered to be a duplicate original, and, as such, it
constitutes primary rather than secondary evidence ...
The genuineness of the document was fully established by
the president of the defendant corporation .... 9'
As he re-read his words, Chief Judge Brune paled. He said, in effect, "I see how the opinion could be read to say that unsigned carbons are duplicate originals, but this is not what we meant. We
meant only to acknowledge that carbons can be duplicate originals
and to decide that the concession of Scherr on the stand that this
was a genuine copy was an adequate foundational substitute for the
signature on the copy, to enable it to come in as a duplicate original." It was several days before the judge's good spirits returned.
This account is, of course, inadmissible evidence as to the
meaning of the opinion, but I am sure that it is correct. As far as I
know, everyone has read the opinion in the way not intended. This
incident shows one important way in which the law advances, or, at
any rate, changes. 9 5

93. 217 Md. 539, 542, 144 A.2d 69, 71 (1958). Judge Murphy interprets the case as I
did. SeeJ. MURPHY, supra note 1, § 1104(B)(2).
94. ParrConstr. Co., 217 Md. at 542, 144 A.2d at 71.
95. For further changes, see MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-103 (1989).

